Evolution of Cooperation in an Incentive Based Business Game Environment by Bista, Sanat Kumar et al.
Evolution of Cooperation in an Incentive Based 
Business Game Environment 
Sanat Kumar Bista1, Keshav P Dahal1, Peter I Cowling1 
 
1MOSAIC Research Centre, University of Bradford, Bradford, West Yorkshire, 
BD7 1DP, UK 
Abstract  
This paper discusses our investigation into the evolution of cooperative players in 
an online business environment. We explain our design of an incentive based 
system with its foundation over binary reputation system whose proportion of 
reward or punishment is a function of transaction value and the player’s past 
history of cooperation. We compare the evolution of cooperation in our setting 
with non-incentive based environment and our findings show that the incentive 
based method is more suitable for the evolution of trustworthy players.  
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1 Introduction 
Trust is a crucial component of society. As a foundation of human civilization, 
trust continues to be important in all aspects of life. Whether we rely or not on 
some object is guided by how trust worthy we believe it to be. In a social context, 
trust worthiness is assessed in several ways, for example by referring to the past 
history of interaction, word-of-mouth, reliable third party certification, social 
reputation etc [1-3].  
 
Computational model of trust in online societies is not straightforward. One of 
the common ways of assessing trustworthiness in online societies is a reputation 
mechanism and it has emerged as an important component of electronic markets in 
eliciting cooperation within loosely coupled and geographically dispersed 
economic agents [4]. Online auction and business sites like eBay, Yahoo Auction, 
Amazon.com etc use simple yet effective reputation management frameworks to 
provide their users with reputation information. The success of these trading 
environments demonstrates that reputation mechanisms are an effective way of 
inferring trust worthiness in the transacting parties. However, with strategic players 
in application fronts it has become increasingly difficult to identify a trustworthy 
partner for interaction. These types of systems largely preserve user anonymity and 
this brings additional challenges. Thus it is necessary to identify the parameters 
that would contribute positively in making possible the evolution of a cooperative 
society. The system we discuss and propose is a possible step towards this.   
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2 Background 
The trust and reputation management framework we are considering builds upon 
the requirements of online market places. Online reputation systems like that of 
eBay represents a simple and successful binary reputation based quality of service 
monitoring utility the in existing online business environments. The problem for 
the eBay reputation system [5] is to compute a trustworthiness value given the total 
number of positive feedbacks (Vp) and the total number of negative feedbacks (Vn) 
received by the player (the term player would be used to describe the buyer as well 
as seller). If any player ABC has a total of 4746 unique positive feed backs (Vp) 
and a total of 9 unique negative feedbacks (Vn). The positive feedback value 
expressed in percentage is thus the ratio of positive votes to the sum of positive and 
negative votes, which in this case becomes 99.8%.  
 
The rating process however does not consider the value of good that is being 
sold or purchased and the reputation of the player who is a seller or buyer in the 
process. This information is quite significant while assessing the quality of 
feedback and reputation consequently. It is always possible that a player might 
build a good reputation score by transacting small valued goods at first and later on 
might ‘cheat’ in a high value transaction [6].  Similarly, the feedback provided by a 
player with high reputation should be more meaningful than that provided by 
players with lower reputation; these points seem to be neglected by the current 
online recommendation systems. In our investigation, we include these parameters 
and present a comparative analysis of the results of evolution that was obtained by 
considering and not considering these parameters. We show that the inclusion of 
these parameters in the business process contributes in the evolution of a 
cooperative society with a larger number of cooperative players in it.   
 
The experiments for this investigation were carried out in an Iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma [7] like setting over a spatial distribution of players. IPD environment 
represents social dilemma situation [8] [7] [9]. A typical online business setting has 
a dilemma situation, as a buyer doesn’t know the seller and either of the parties are 
not sure of cooperation. Defection in a one shot business interaction seems to be 
attractive but in a repeated interaction, cooperation might still be attractive as it 
gains an increased reputation for the player and this could be helpful in future 
business, hence the dilemma.  The pay offs for Temptation(T), Reward(R), 
Punishment(P) and Sucker(S) within an Iterated Prisoner’s dilemma game would 
strictly follow the following two inequalities, (i). T>R>P>S, and (ii). 2R>T+S [7]. 
The pay offs in a typical business game would have a different relationship (as 
expressed in Table 2 Section 4).  The real difference that this has brought about is 
in making defection even more attractive over cooperation as the reward value now 
becomes equal to punishment. This endangers the dilemma situation and a right 
incentive for cooperation needs to be added for the dilemma to continue.   
 
In the simulation, number of players would play the cooperation-defection over 
generations in a genetic algorithm based environment. The payoff values as 
obtained would work as a fitness function for the GA based simulation, where the 
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player strategies are represented by the chromosomes and each chromosome is a 
fixed length representation of player strategies in terms of cooperation (C) and 
defection (D). Essentially, the system searches for an optimal strategy.  
 
A memory-3 game with four specific possible moves (CC, CD, DC, DD) is 
played between the players thus making the chromosome size 64 (43).  The original 
IPD tournaments were described by Axelrod in [7] and it was first programmed by 
Forrest [10]. Axelrod used additional 6 bits to determine the first three moves. A 
variation of this was used by Errity in [11] and we are following the same scheme 
of additional bit encoding, in which 7 extra bits are used for encoding actions for 
the first three relative moves (relative to opponent moves). In this approach it is not 
required to encode an assumption of the pre-game history [11]. For reproduction, 
the system is capable of performing a crossover as well as mutation. During 
crossover, both the parent chromosomes are broken in at the same random point. 
Values of  0.001 for the mutation probability and 0.5 for crossover probability have 
been used throughout the game. The players have been categorized into six 
different types as defined by the percentage of cooperative actions exhibited in 
their strategy as represented in their chromosomes. Table 1 below presents the 
classification: 
Table 1 Player Classification 
Player Type Cooperation (%)  
Very Cooperative > 65 
Cooperative  55 to 65 
Good 50 to 54 
Okay 45 to 49 
Dishonest 35 to 44 
Very Dishonest < 35 
 
 
3    Related Works 
Trust and Reputation in the context of e-commerce environments and Peer to Peer 
systems have been an area of significant interest in recent.  Aberer in [8] outlines 
the complexity of Trust and Reputation and discusses different approaches to 
computing trust and reputation. The authors have considered evolutionary 
approach as one of the many popular approaches that game theorists have been 
using.  In [12] the authors have presented a social mechanism of reputation 
management in electronic communities. In their discussion around electronic 
communities, the authors have described the Prisoner’s dilemma situation in it. Our 
choice of a Prisoner’s Dilemma like environment to represent online business 
interaction has been justified by their discussion in these papers. 
 
   In [6] the authors describe their design of a reputation management system for 
peer-to-peer systems in electronic communities. While listing the problems of 
electronic communities, the authors have marked the lack of incentives in rating to 
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be a major one. In addition the paper also highlights the existing systems’ lack of 
ability in handling strategic players. Our research is fueled by these two listings.   
 
In a related work Janssen in [9] has  studied the role of reputation scores in the 
evolution of cooperation in online e-commerce sites. The author discusses whether 
or not reputation alone can be meaningful in evolving a cooperative society. The 
paper concludes that high level cooperation is not only possible with reputation 
scores. The author investigates the work in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma like 
environment.     
 
Based on these findings, our work in this paper concentrates on investigating the 
possible role of incentive in the evolution of cooperation.  
 
 
4 Problem Definition and Incentive Based Model 
The problem we are considering is a typical business game between a buyer and a 
seller. The corresponding actions and the pay offs are explained by the matrix 
representation in table 2 below: 
 
Table 2 Pay-off Matrix for business game 
 
 
 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
C sellerR = Money 
 buyerR  =Good(s)  
sellers = - (Money)  
BuyerT = Money + Good(s)  
D 
sellerT = Good(s)+ Money    
 
Buyers = - (Good(s)) 
sellerP = Money 
buyerP =Good (s)  
 
Here, R represents the reward pay off, S the suckers pay off, T for Temptation 
payoff and P for punishment payoff. It is clear from the table that in any case the 
player is in safe side to play a defection. If the other player cooperates it is going to 
receive a Temptation pay off which is twice the amount of Reward (as the defector 
would have goods as well as money in his hand), and even if the other player plays 
a defection it is going to receive a Punishment payoff which is equal in value to the 
reward pay off (as the player would still have in his hand either the goods or 
money). A player who cooperated while his opponent defected will loose money as 
well as goods. If we think of any online business environment preserving total 
anonymity of players, then the situation is closely resembled by the one described 
above. As an example, if we keep the ‘physical’ means of user identification and 
loss compensation schemes as a constant, this situation reflects the eBay like 
business scenario. This situation should not exist as it might result in a high 
Pbuyer
Pseller 
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number of selfish players in the society, a fact that is demonstrated in our 
experimental results.  
 
To avoid this situation we focus our investigation on what impact the inclusion of 
player reputation and price related data can be in the evolution of cooperation. In 
our model we use ‘bonus reward’ as an incentive to cooperative behavior in the 
game. Mutual cooperation in a game representing a single transaction would result 
in a payoff equivalent to the reward as in Table 2. Plus, we would assign a bonus 
reward, computed as a function of the player reputation and value of the goods. In 
the other hand, in a case where both parties defect each other, their corresponding 
pay off values are subjected to a decrement in pay off indicating a more severe 
penalty for punishment. In the later case bonus reward would be subtracted from 
the reward value. In a simple approach towards this we base the reward and 
punishment pay off to be dependent on the following two parameters: 
 
a. The price value of the transaction(equal to the Reward for cooperation ) 
b. The existing cooperation probability (reputation) of the player as given by 
its history of cooperation and defection.  
 
The corresponding actions and associated pay offs for an incentive based setting is 
represented by Table 3 below: 
 
Table 3 Incentive compatible Pay-off Matrix for business game 
 
 
 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
C GPsellerGseller ValVal ×+= θR   
GPBuyerGbuyer ValVal ×+= θR  
Gseller Vals −=  
GBuyer ValT ×= 2  
D Gseller ValT ×= 2   
 
GBuyer Vals −=  
)Val(ValP GPsellerGseller ×−= θ  
)Val(ValP GPBuyerGbuyer ×−= θ  
 
Here, ValG represents the value of goods being transacted and θ  represents the 
reputation of the player.  The reputation information is maintained by the system as 
a vector with a total number of Cooperation (C) and Defection (D):  
 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
D
C
TH                                                                                                            (1)  
The expected probability of cooperation is given by the following expression:   
DC
CPE n +=)(
                                                                                                     (2) 
Where, the values for C and D are derived from the transaction history in (1).  
 
Pseller 
Pbuyer
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5 Experimental Setup and Results 
The experiments were carried out in two phases. In the first phase a total of 2500 
players were selected to play a non-incentive business game for 5000 generations 
with 100 iterations in each generation. The pay-off values for this game were based 
on the explanation provided in Table 2 above. In the second phase by keeping the 
other parameters same, a pro-incentive business model with pay-off values as listed 
in Table 3 above was simulated. The system recorded the readings of the player 
evolution and the cooperative and defective moves in each interaction. The results 
obtained are an average of 10 rounds of simulation. We assume that each player 
initially has a truth telling probability of 1. Further, we assume that the players are 
transacting goods of same value through out.  
 
The stacked bar diagrams in figure 1 below shows the percentage growth share in 
the evolution of the six different types of players in each of the settings.  In the 
diagram, it is clearly shown that the population of cooperative players (Very 
cooperative, cooperative, good and okay players) rise to higher values as the 
evolution continues in a pro-incentive setting. Classification of these players in 
terms of probability of cooperation was presented in Table 1 before. The 
population of non cooperative players (very dishonest and dishonest players) is 
high and continues to grow in a non-incentive setting.   
 
          
Fig. 1. Evolution of different player types over 5000 generations 
(1,100,500,1000,1500,2000,2500,3000,3500,4000,4500 and 5000 respectively) in a non-
incentive and pro-incentive business game environment 
The evolution trends of each type of player were observed in comparison with 
respect to each game setting. The graphs in Fig.2 below represent the comparative 
trend of evolution of the six different types of players.  The evolution trend in 
general shows that the pro-incentive setting is favorable for the evolution of 
cooperative players while the non-incentive setting is favorable to the non-
cooperative player evolution.  
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Fig.2. Comparative evolution of six different player types in a non-incentive and pro-
incentive business game setting  
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Another interesting aspect is the reputation of the players. In each play in 
the game, the cooperative and defective moves of the players were recorded in 
order to calculate the total reputation score. Reputation would be calculated as in 
expression (2) above. An average reputation score of 0.98 was recorded for pro-
incentive business game whereas a very low average score of 0.003 was recorded 
for non-incentive setting. This result is in correlation to the population of non-
cooperative players who would defect in maximum as opposed to the cooperative 
instances of good players in the pro-incentive environment.    
 
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
“Hard security mechanisms” like authentication, access control, encryption etc 
have been in use in  different online business environments to reduce the chances 
of fraudulent acts [13, 14]. Such mechanisms might also include the registration 
requirements, requirements of personal details including bank and physical 
address, telephone numbers etc. While these mechanisms do certainly contribute in 
reducing possibly fraudulent players from appearing in the market, they also 
reduce the level of participation in terms of numbers. Further, dishonest behaviors 
can also be demonstrated by players who pass it. The notion of trustworthiness in 
online societies is really complex [8], and such hard security mechanisms might 
not be enough to curb on the temptation of defectors.  
 
In an eBay like online business environment, if this was completely open, meaning 
that there would be completely no registration requirements for players and that the 
system would preserve total anonymity, the situation is in the worst case similar to 
the one depicted in our non-incentive business game. We suggested a pro-incentive 
model which demonstrated to be favorable for the evolution of cooperative players 
in society thus, leading to cooperation and trustworthiness with highly reputed 
players in it. Our investigation shows that the pro-incentive model which is an 
interrelated representation of cooperative behavior and reputation would be even 
more suitable for an open business environment. Our future investigation in this 
line could involve the formalization of incentive model, specifying the reputation 
to reflect the incentive for cooperation.  
 
7 References 
[1] Dellarocas, C., The Digitization of Word-of-Mouth: Promise and 
Challenges of the Online Feedback Mechanisms, in MIT Sloan School of 
Management Working Paper. 2003, MIT: Cambridge, MA,USA. p. 36. 
[2] Aberer, K., et al., P-Grid: a self-organizing structured P2P System, in 
ACM SIGMOD. 2003. p. 29-33. 
[3] Josang, A., R. Ismail, and C. Boyd, A survey of Trust and Reputation for 
online service provision. Decision Support Systems, 2007. 43(2): p. 618-
644. 
[4] Dellarocas, C., Reputation Mechanism Design in Online Trading 
Environments with Pure Moral Hazard. Information Systems Research, 
2005. 16(2): p. 209-230. 
Evolution of Cooperation in an Incentive Based Business Game Environment 
  9 
[5] EBay. Buy and sell electronics, cars, clothing, apparel, collectibles, 
sporting goods, digital cameras, and everything else on eBay, the world's 
online marketplace.  2007  [cited 2007 April 2 2007]; Available from: 
http://www.ebay.com. 
[6] Xiong, L. and L. Liu, PeerTrust: Supporting Reputation Based Trust for 
Peer-to-Peer electronic Communities. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge 
and Data Engineering, 2004. 16(7): p. 843-857. 
[7] Axelrod, R., ed. The Evolution of Cooperation. 1984, Basic Books, New 
York. 
[8] Aberer, K., et al. The Complex Facets of Reputation and Trust. in 9th 
Fuzzy Days, International conference on computational intelligence Fuzzy 
Logic Neural Networks and Evolutionary Algorithms. 2006. Dortmund, 
Germany. 
[9] Janssen, M., Evolution of Cooperation when feedback to reputation scores 
is voluntary. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2006. 
9(1): p. 17. 
[10] Goldberg, D.E., Genetic Algorithms in search, Optimization and Machine 
Learning. 1989: Pearson Education Inc. 
[11] Errity, A., Evolving Strategies for Prisoner's dilemma. 2003, Dublin City 
University: Dublin. 
[12] Yu, B. and M.P. Singh. A Social Mechanism of Reputation Management 
in Electronic Communities. in 4th International Workshop on Cooperative 
Information Agents(CIA) 2000. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
[13] Rasmusson, L. and S. Janssen. Simulated Social Control for secure 
Internet Commerce. in Proceedings of the New Security Paradigms 
Workshop. 1996. 
[14] Josang, A. and J. Haller. Dirichlet Reputation Systems. in 2nd 
International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 
2007). 2007. Vienna, Austria. 
 
 
